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1. Introduction
the research aim of these analyses is twofold. firstly it investigates the 
functioning and relevance of a “last resort” safety net by providing up to 
date estimates on the size and determinants of non-take-up of monetary 
social assistance in austria, Germany and finland.2  low participation 
rates may distort the intended welfare impact of targeted social transfers. 
furthermore, the social and financial outcomes of benefit reforms are 
much more unclear without information on current non-take-up, notwith-
standing that claiming behaviour is influenced by possible reforms, too.
secondly there is also a methodological interest: the results contribute  
towards the objective of “promoting and supporting comparative re-
search, methodologies and data generation” by revising poverty and 
income distribution statistics currently derived from tax/benefit micro-
simulation models without correcting for errors in targeting benefits. the 
assumption that all potentially entitled persons actually receive the benefit 
biases the microsimulation analysis of income inequality and related indi-
cators.
in view of a possible further harmonisation of social policies in the Euro-
pean union, the analysis gains even more importance as it represents the 
first comparative analysis of this kind based on similar micro-simulation 
techniques and detailed empirical data.
Michael Fuchs is researcher at the  
European Centre for social Welfare  
policy and research, Vienna,
http://www.euro.centre.org/fuchs
1 Comparative empirical analysis and 
powerpoint presentation underlying this 
policy Brief by olaf Groh-samberg, Joachim 
r. frick (both DiW Berlin), olivier Bargain 
(university College Dublin) and michael 
fuchs. it draws heavily on fuchs 2007.   
the analysis was carried out as part of the 
accurate income measurement for the 
assessment of public policies project  
(aim-ap), funded as specific targeted  
research or innovation project within the 
6th framework programme of the  
European Commission (project no. 
028412). i am grateful for advice and  
comments from Christine lietz,  
manos matsaganis, stephen pudney,  
holly sutherland and asghar Zaidi.
2 the programmes under investigation 
are the cash benefits in the “open”  
social assistance, including permanent  
and temporary monetary transfers  
plus housing and heating supplements.
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2. Literature review
2.1 Determinants of (non-)take-up
the economic literature (see for example anderson/meyer 1997, Blank/
ruggles 1996, Engels 2001, hernanz et al. 2004, kayser/frick 2001, 
riphahn 2001) provides theoretical models of the determinants of (non-)
take-up. they stress the direct and indirect costs of applying, including 
both objective barriers and subjective motives. for descriptive purposes 
they can be subsumed under four categories (not exhaustive and entirely 
exclusive):
1. pecuniary determinants in the sense of a rational cost-benefit equation: 
the focus of this category is on the level of benefits and the expected 
duration of receipt.  a renouncement to claim will take place if the ex-
pected benefit amount is too low and/or the expected duration of the 
benefit spell is too short to offset costs (claiming is costly in terms of 
time and effort, e.g. queuing, need to report detailed information to the 
welfare agency, checks on the willingness to accept suitable job offers, 
etc.). on the other hand, the (almost) money-less will hardly be able to 
“decide” not to claim.
2. information costs about benefit regulations and application procedures: 
collecting, understanding and completing application procedures imply 
costs. Entitled persons may abstain from taking-up if the procedures 
are too complex or disorganised. this includes different degrees of 
lack of information (up to being not aware of the benefit at all or the 
eligibility for it), false information and wanting access to help.
3. administrative costs related to the duration of the administrative 
process and to uncertainties about the application outcome: frequently 
it takes time till an application is submitted and processed. if the 
expected eligibility spell is short or there are concrete expectations 
about future incomes (e.g., expectation to take up a new job relatively 
quickly), potential claimants may be induced not to participate. regard-
ing entitlement uncertainty it is assumed that a higher probability for 
acceptance of the welfare application (e.g. in the case of families with 
children, etc.) will lead to higher take-up.
4. social and psychological costs: these “indirect” costs include the overall 
perception of state aid as degrading. in addition, the targeting of ben-
efits to specific groups may expose them to stigmatisation. the acting 
of welfare officials towards claimants may also be perceived as humili-
ating, particularly if the administration acts as a fraud controller, too.
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however, one has to bear in mind that non-take-up is not only influenced 
by “decisions” of eligible persons but also by administrative decisions (e.g. 
errors in evaluation procedures, discretionary decisions based on loose 
programme rules, etc.) which might lead to the rejection of applications 
by eligible persons (hernanz et al. 2004, 8), termed as “primary” vs. “sec-
ondary” non-take-up (Van oorshot 1991).
2.2 Problematic outcomes of non-take-up
the outcomes of high benefit non-take-up can be considered as problem-
atic in several respects (see for example Engels 2001, hernanz et al. 2004, 
kayser/frick 2001):
the welfare goals of benefit programmes are not entirely reached; there 
is a failure in the provision of a safety net for those in need (as the 
targeted benefits often do not reach the target group) and in reducing 
poverty.
non-participation causes unjustified disparities among eligible clients. this 
becomes a serious problem if the “decision” is at least partly involuntary, 
i.e. if some households are discouraged from claiming because of objec-
tive or subjective barriers (e.g. if only the better informed claim and, thus, 
possibly not those who would benefit most).
finally, non-take-up reduces the capacity to anticipate both social out-
comes and financial costs of policy reforms and leads to interpretation 
problems: the receipt of social assistance cannot be considered as a reli-
able indicator for deprived circumstances, if it mirrors only the observ-
able part.
2.3 Policies to improve take-up
following the theoretical models, non-take-up suggests that the antici-
pated benefit falls short of perceived claiming costs. if such costs are the 
consequences of intransparent and complex schemes, poor information, 
etc., they imply a failure in the design or implementation of the pro-
gramme (kayser/frick 2001).  as information and administration barriers 
often play an important part, a few relatively small measures could be 
very effective. in general, these could consist in providing the required 
information for potential beneficiaries about existence and application 
procedures, simplifying the application process and making it more com-
prehensible as well as arranging the screening of applications in a more 
transparent and objective way (Engels 2001, hernanz et al. 2004).
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2.4 Empirical data on non-take-up
in particular when compared to universal transfers, means-tested pro-
grammes are always characterised by a certain extent of access problems. 
however, precise empirical data on non-take-up are limited – partly due 
to the high-quality requirements for this kind of analysis. Evidence for 
four European countries (uk, fr, DE, nl) in the 1990s suggests that non-
take-up of social assistance can be considered as a widespread problem. 
the estimates show figures between 30% and 65% (hernanz et al. 2004, 
10). 3
3. Institutional settings of cash social assist- 
 ance in Austria, Germany and Finland
With a view on the programme as being part of their national social 
security system, in austria, Germany and finland social assistance can be 
characterised as a means-tested subsidiary safety net. the target group 
consists of people who are not able to rely on own resources (work, in-
come, assets), resources of their family (maintenance obligation) or other 
entitlements (social insurance benefits, etc.) in order to obtain sufficient 
means for a humane living.
in a typology of social assistance regimes based on the programme struc-
ture and its generosity for the early 1990s (Gough et al. 1997), austria’s 
social assistance system is termed as “decentralised, discretionary relief”. 
the benefit is financed by the federal states, thus 9 different regula-
tions are in place. the system in Germany is described as “dual social 
assistance” (related to national legal framing, but local execution) with 
low benefits on average. finally, finland’s social assistance is classified as 
“citizenship-based, but residual assistance” with relatively high benefits.
trends in the number of recipients since the mid-1990s show steadily 
increasing figures in austria, whereas in Germany and finland a peak was 
reached in 1996/97 with a relatively constant course in Germany and a 
moderate decrease in finland afterwards. figures for 2003 point to the 
fact that the number of benefit receivers is by far the highest in finland 
(more than 10% of the total population), followed by Germany (more 
than 3%) and austria (more than 1%). in all three countries the figures 
suggest a changed structure among recipients, namely an increased share 
of people in working age (unemployed, “working poor”).
3 throughout the policy brief,  
non-take-up is defined as the ratio  
between the number of households 
which are not receiving the benefit and 
the total number of households which 
are potentially eligible (=100%).
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4. Empirical results: non-take-up rates and  
 determinants of non-take-up in Austria,  
 Germany and Finland4 
in the base scenarios the non-take-up of monetary social assistance in 
terms of eligible households would comprise of 56% in austria (2003), 
59% in finland (2002) and 67% in Germany (2002).
the sensitivity analyses provide upper and lower boundaries for the esti-
mations by using different scenarios which tighten or ease the conditions 
that determine entitlement in the model (increase/decrease of allowable 
incomes/household needs, proxy for assets in the means-test). they sug-
gest that in all three countries at least half of those households eligible to 
social assistance did not claim (cf. table 1).
the theoretical models of take-up assume that the expectations related 
to benefit level and eligibility spells as well as perceived application and 
psychological costs influence the participation decision. the probability to 
participate can also be translated into a function of household character-
istics which correlate with the (non-)take-up:
Household i takes up at time t if expected utility derived from receipt of social 
assistance exceeds utility from non-participation minus claiming costs (kayser/
frick 2001).
as the direct observation of most of these explaining factors is con-
strained by the availability of respective information in the data, following 
kayser/frick (2001) different proxies have to be employed:
the “relative poverty gap”5 proxies pecuniary determinants, i.e. the level 
of benefit or, in other words, the material urgency of the respective 
household.
there are also other proxies for benefit level and expected duration of 
benefit receipt which illustrate the household’s expectations towards 
the future, too, hence affecting also direct application costs: in that sense 
information and administrative costs may be lower, e.g. for those with 
less education, for unemployed, households with children, etc. because 
they are more likely in need of assistance for longer periods of time and 
higher amounts (Dahan/nisan 2007, 23). a particular group less likely to 
participate might be households with migration background as, for exam-
ple, these households face more language barriers and in addition those 
without citizenship may face more uncertainty of claiming.
4 on data and methods see fuchs 2007.
5 Calculated as the simulated amount 
of social assistance a given household is 
eligible for, controlling for own incomes, 
as percentage of simulated total needs.
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social and psychological costs depend on distaste for welfare by house-
hold members themselves as well as on perceived stigmatisation (by 
persons in the neighbourhood as well as government officials). this may 
differ across age groups as well as across community size (larger towns 
provide more anonymity) and across family types (perceiving less stigma 
by administrators if the benefit is also to meet children’s needs, etc.).
probit models were used to calculate the probability of non-take-up re-
lated to individual and household characteristics. for austria and Germa-
ny the results support the hypothesis of pecuniary determinants: higher 
entitlements measured by the poverty gap have a significant positive 
effect on take-up. in all three countries households with an unemployed, 
inactive or retired as well as with a low-educated head (the latter two 
categories not significant for at) are more likely to participate. Claim-
ing costs pay off in the light of an increased perception of need (longer 
periods of time and higher amounts). to make ends meet these house-
holds may even have no other choice. in addition, as already depending on 
welfare they may already be well informed about their entitlements and 
hence information costs might be low.
also households only renting their flat feature a higher probability to 
take-up (significant only for sf). Compared to those owning their home 
or flat, application costs may be lower as they may also be more likely in 
need of assistance for longer periods of time (kayser/frick 2001). other 
variables used as proxies for application costs, among them migration 
background and disability status, show no significant impact.
as regards proxies for social and psychological costs, residence in a  
metropolitan area, although in at not significant, shows the expected 
positive impact on take-up (no data for sf). this supports the hypothesis 
that the anonymity of living in a big town reduces stigma. in addition, 
social assistance receipt is not so unusual and information might be more 
easily distributed.
furthermore, for austria and finland family composition (lone parents) 
positively impacts on a household’s participation (for at not significant). 
although in Germany adults with children show a lesser tendency to 
participate compared to single adults, there seems to be a higher take-up 
probability with an increasing number of children. Beside lower applica-
tion costs (expected longer eligibility spell), less perceived stigma when 
there are children and a higher acceptance probability by officials might 
support the decision to take-up.
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age only has a significant impact in finland (as in austria elderly tend to 
feature higher participation rates), households with a male head do not 
show a significantly higher probability to participate.
in all three countries the pseudo r-squared amounts to 33/34% and, 
hence, explains around one third of the total variance (cf. table 2).
5. Conclusions
one of the aims of this analysis was to investigate the functioning and rel-
evance of the second safety net of monetary social assistance in austria, 
Germany and finland in a comparative way based on detailed empirical 
data. although certain restrictions in the data availability and in specific 
simulation possibilities have to be considered, the analysis showed signifi-
cant results:
Calculating participation rates under various scenarios (assuming possible 
measurement errors by varying both underlying incomes and simulated 
needs, using a proxy for assets to be taken into account in the means-
test) suggests that there is a comparable size of non-take-up in all three 
countries which exceeds 50% of all potentially eligible households (base-
line scenarios: at 56%, sf 59%, DE 67%).
to investigate the determinants of non-take-up, multiple regression analy-
ses (also adopted to control for possible endogeneity of independent 
variables; see fuchs 2007) were applied. it can be resumed that related to 
the decision to participate, distinct differences across population groups 
exist. several proxies for hypotheses based on theoretical models of take-
up (rational cost-benefit equation; claim if information, administration and 
psychological costs are relatively low or offset by expected benefit) show 
a relatively similar effect across the three countries, despite few contra-
dicting results.
participation rates are uniformly higher in case of a non-employed head, 
a low-educated head, in case of renting (instead of owning the home or 
flat) and if the household is situated in a metropolitan area (for the last 
category no data for sf). however, a significant effect of a higher “poverty 
gap”, i.e. higher benefit levels entitled to, can only be observed for austria 
and Germany, higher participation rates of lone parents only for austria 
and finland.
the second purpose of this analysis related to the methodological inter-
est. the distributional impact of targeting errors is not negligible: e.g. for 
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austria the poverty rate (60%-median) derived from the original silC-
data amounts to 12.8% and the Gini to 0.258 in 2003, whereas under the 
assumption of full take-up (of all simulated means-tested benefits, not 
only monetary social assistance) this decreases to 10.0% and 0.238.
how far is it possible to account for non-take-up in micro-databases and 
tax/benefit microsimulation models (among them EuromoD)? a sound 
first step to introduce (low) participation rates (and hence a certain form 
of behavioural modelling) could be based on results from this compara-
tive analysis. Corrections for households with non-take-up could be 
applied countrywise on a reduced set of common variables for which 
correlation with non-participation is found, as the probability of claiming 
can be estimated as a function of household characteristics.
however, prevalent measurement errors (data and simulation errors), 
which do not allow a perfect simulation of eligibility, make take-up model-
ling relatively difficult. as it is not straightforward to identify models for 
potential measurement errors, a basic knowledge about the nature of the 
measurement error, e.g. related to reported incomes, would be needed. 
possible extensions in this direction remain a topic for future work. im-
provements could also result from multiple measurements of (reported) 
incomes and benefit receipt, e.g. by comparing survey data with register 
data (already the case in finland).
furthermore, future research could possibly also benefit from the 
longitudinal features of datasets. overall, take-up should be viewed as a 
dynamic process, e.g. becoming aware of being eligible followed by later 
transition from non-participation to claiming. thus, analyses on the indi-
vidual continuation of non-take-up and on reliable trends in overall rates 
over time would be very useful. in addition, new benefit reforms are likely 
to change also participation decisions which points the research interest 
to the reaction of individuals towards institutional changes.
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AT (2003) DE (2002) SF (2002)
base scenarios 56 67 59
checks measurement error incomes/needs
incomes -5% 60 71 60
incomes +5% 54 65 58
needs +5% 61 69 60
needs -5% 54 66 58
robustness check: proxy for assets in means-test; not eligible if …
capital income  
>100 Eur per year*
49 - -
* DE: assets considered (information in the survey data); sf: no assets check in the means-test.
 
AT DE SF
relative poverty gap (in %) -0.012* -0.029*** -0.002
age -0.083 0.010 -0.086***
Type of hh (Ref=single adult)
  lone parent -0.526 0.092 -0.493**
  adults w/o children 7.270# 0.081 -0.284
  adults with children -0.339 0.766** -0.077
no. of children 0.233 -0.496*** -0.089
male (ref=female) -0.539 0.215 -0.029
home owner (ref=no) 0.809 0.520 1.207***
migration background (ref=no) 0.121 0.063 -
Community size (Ref=middle)
  rural area 1.002 -0.456** -
  metropolitan area -0.318 -0.533*** -
Education (Ref=middle vocational)
  lower education -0.748 -0.310* -0.396***
  higher vocational 0.428 0.123 -0.086
  higher education -0.254 -0.755** 0.612**
hh head is disabled (ref=no) 0.239 -0.324 -
Employment status (Ref=full time)
  part-time - -0.400 -0.193
  unemployed -1.425** -0.748** -0.608***
  not working -1.751*** -1.090*** -0.484**
  self-employed - -0.895 0.353**
  pensioner -0.292 -1.115** -0.473**
Constant 5.794** 2.816*** 2.658***
observations 146 482 1287
pseudo r-squared 0.34 0.33 0.34
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; # perfect matching
Table 1
non-take-up in % of 
potential eligible households 
(=100%): base scenarios & 
sensitivity analyses
Table 2
Correlates of non-take-up 
(simple probit: dependent 
dummy variable: 0 take-up, 
1 non-take-up)
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